Introduction
Haggard and Kaufman in their recent book (2008) Choosing the region of Eastern Europe this study asks a similar question and investigates the effect of electoral revolutions which between 1996 and 2005 took place in eight countries of the post-communist region on socioeconomic consolidation of these countries, looking closer at two early cases of electoral breakthroughs -Bulgaria and Slovakia.
When thinking about democratization in the post-communist world, Bunce (2005:2) identified three paths to democracy: the first she named "early, fast and easy model" including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic states in it. On the second path termed "later, slower, but still successful model", Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovakia could be located. "Later, slower but uncertain" path to democracy was lived through in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. What unites the countries in the second and third democratization path is an occurrence of watershed elections. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, a series of electoral revolutions swept across the post-communist region.
Out of the twenty-six transforming economies, we have seen a similar event occurring in eight countries which had all shared illiberal or hybrid regimes prior to the crucial elections -Romania `96, Bulgaria `97, Slovakia `98, Serbia `00, Croatia `00, Georgia `03, Ukraine `04 and Kyrgyzstan `05. In all these states, in presidential or parliamentary elections broad mass vote participation took place and the liberal opposition managed to defeat the semiauthoritarian incumbents, moving these nations in a more democratic direction.
Several questions come to surface in respect to these phenomena. What conditions gave rise to these breakthrough elections? What were common procedural features? How to understand electoral revolution and how to differentiate it from normal electoral turnover as well as from the first elections at the break of the regimes? To address these questions, a new area of research came forward where the electoral revolutions have been Similarly to logic presented in Haggard and Kaufman (2008) , the original working hypothesis expects to find improvements in socio-economic development due to several reasons. First, arguably, the dissatisfaction of citizens who rallied in the streets was multifaced and, as this study will show, the political dimension was only one of several along which the discontent transpired. Second, electoral revolutions were characterized by the ability of opposition parties to unite across political parties which is a factor conducive to potential reforms. Indeed, in this respect, the electoral revolutions brought about unique windows of opportunity for changing the developmental paths of the countries. Third, electoral revolutions were characterized by rallies and high degree of public involvement which significantly contributed to the success of electoral outcomes. Therefore, the new leaders were 'indebted' to public.
Yet the expectations of the research were not confirmed. The analysis finds that while the pivotal elections were clearly a success in a narrow understanding of de-powering the illiberal incumbents, the improvements in socioeconomic development varied. The postelectoral success in a broad sense of bringing tangible improvements was context dependent and materialized to the greatest extent on the dimension where the country had the most difficulties prior to the revolution. While the main motivation of 'regime change' in Slovakia was dissatisfaction with Mečiar's semi-authoritarianism, economic crisis was the main factor behind the quest for change in Bulgaria. Hence, the main gains were political in Slovakia while in Bulgaria they materialized mainly along (macro-) economic lines. In neither of the cases, however, was the sizeable improvement in democratization and in macroeconomic criteria accompanied by similar improvement in social dimension. Albeit both countries are by now EU members, my findings support the claims of those scholars who point to the role of historical legacies in transitional success (Kuzio, 2008; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007) : the good start that Slovakia embarked on in the early 1990s versus the very slow transition in Bulgaria seem to have been detrimental for the extent and success of the catch-up process after their electoral revolutions.
The paper is structured in the following way. The second chapter part reviews literature about democratization, transition and electoral revolutions. Chapter three reviews the regimes in Bulgaria and Slovakia prior to the revolution and establishes the basis of electoral revolutions. Chapter four reviews the effects of electoral revolutions on political, economic and social dimension and the final part draws conclusions.
I.
Literature review
a. Democratization and welfare states in Eastern Europe
When the democratization set in the post-communist region in early 1990s, among the tasks that had to be performed was not only a reform of political system but also a reform of the economy from socialist to market led. Eastern Europe entered transition with a strong legacy of welfare states which were institutionally set up and developed under socialist regime or even before. Alike to Western European societies, state-socialist policies were tied to labor policies but unlike the democratic states, also fixed to central administration. One particular feature of the system was the fact that a substantial part of welfare resources was allocated on the basis of employment which was made available and mandatory to everyone by state. Free access to education and health care are among the remnants of the socialist regime and remained largely intact until today.
As the state was retreating during transition, political, economic and social reforms unfolded in different forms in terms of speed, sequencing and comprehensiveness in the individual CEE states. Fiscal pressures which accompanied the process throughout were an important constraint on development of social policy. The social dimension of transition was originally the most neglected -by international institutions as well as individual states -and came to the forefront of the reform processes only well into the late 1990s (Orenstein and Haas, 2002 ). An exception to that was the introduction of unemployment schemes and other labor market mechanisms which played a crucial role in helping the societies adjust to the negative effects of restructuring and integration into global economy (Boeri and Terrell, 2002) . The new schemes were originally fairly generous but were cut back in the second part of the 1990s in the majority of states as an 'unsustainable expense' (Manning, 2004) .
Alongside the reform pressure and fiscal pressures, electoral arena in democracies allows freedom interest groups to voice and demand their claims and gives incentives to political elites to distribute or redistribute income. 2 Electoral revolutions which happened across eight countries in post-communist region have represented another tangible move towards more democracy and accountability. In the following part I review in which way they can be connected to transition literature and how to understand them in relation to socioeconomic issues.
b. Transition and electoral revolutions
The academic debate about electoral revolutions can be broken down into two different, although interrelated perspectives of examination. The first perspective has enhanced electoral revolutions as an independent or intervening variable and analyzed it as a 2 For a detailed overview of literature which has studied the effects of democracy on social policy and social outcomes, see Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 365-369. factor which influenced political and economic transformation in a specific group of postcommunist countries. This approach is part of the broad transition literature which has attempted to explain the variation in the transformation success among the countries.
Within the transition literature framework, one segment emphasizes the importance of the communist legacies and structural conditions at the collapse of the old regime which accounted for different starting conditions (De Melo et al, 1997 , Bunce, 1999 , Balcerowicz, 1994 , Kopstein and Reilly, 2000 , Popov, 2000 . Another branch of transition studies is represented by scholars who stress the prevailing importance of 'agency' and policies or the political decisions of the elites in the transition (De Melo et al, 1996 , Meseznikov et al, 1999 ).
In the aftermath of 'colored revolutions', an area of research emerged where the phenomenon of electoral revolutions has been studied as a dependant variable (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a , Bunce, 2006 , McFaul, 2005 , Silitski, 2005a , Herd, 2005 , Carothers, 2004 , Bunce and Wolchik, 2007 . These scholars have specified characteristics of the societies where the electoral revolution has taken place and defined 'the electoral model' in order to distinguish colored revolution from a traditional change of government through democratic elections. One of the debates resonating in this body of literature has focused on determining the extent and ratio of domestic versus external conditions which contributed to the success of the electoral revolution. Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) have embarked on a comprehensive research to study the second revolutions as a debated outcome of democracy promotion of the Western world in the post-communist region pointing to the importance of domestic factors. Carothers (2004) looked at specific instruments of Western aid in promoting electoral revolutions in the region while Vachudova (2005) analyzed the EU conditionality as an external influence on the transformation of the selected countries. The studies seem to conclude jointly that success of the political shift realized via electoral revolution with a significant external help was in the end determined greatly by the constellation of various domestic factors such as a hybrid character of political regime, emergence of a leader, ability of opposition to unite, use of parallel vote tabulations during the elections, and emergence of a strong civil society (See also: Bunce, 2005 . Silitski, 2005b , Bunce and Wolchik, 2006b were replaced with more reform-oriented parties in government. In simple terms, electoral revolution means elections which produce regime change (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a) . In regard to timing, the events do not refer to the initial transitions from the communist rule which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s but rather to pro-democracy movements that arose in less successful transforming countries against corrupt and proto-democratic successor regimes (Tucker, 2005) . The term 'revolution' could be somewhat misleading as it is a non-violent and peaceful process 3 , although accompanied by mass mobilization not only in high voter turnout but also in protests that preceded or followed the elections (Bunce, 2006) . Thus, the word "revolution" is not meant to imply longer term consequences of electoral episodes but rather only to stress that the pro-democracy movement in each case was in fact successful in overthrowing the current regime (Tucker, 2005) . In their late piece, Bunce and Wolchik (2007) shift to term the phenomenon 'democratizing elections' to stress that what defined these events was not violence but significant change always in more democratic direction.
Scholars differ as to which countries they assess when looking at the episodes of electoral revolutions. Wolchik (2006a, 2007) adopted a broad conception and in addition to the later and typical cases of 'colored revolutions' in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, they also include in their analysis the early instances: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia. The other cluster of scholarship relates primarily to 'typical' occurrences of electoral breakthroughs, which are Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, accompanied by clear attempts to rig the elections by incumbent governments and popular protests following the election (Tucker, 2005 , Herd, 2005 , Silitski, 2005 Kuzio, 2008) .
According to Bunce (2006) , what unites all the cases -early as well as later -is the fact that because governing coalition, ideology and represented constituencies all changed, the elections in these countries served as a major political turning point. In presidential or parliamentary elections broad mass vote participation took place and the liberal opposition managed to defeat the semi-authoritarian incumbents, moving these nations in a more democratic direction. In other elements, either in respect to preceding conditions in individual countries or in regard to the procedural elements of the breakthrough, the countries differ: some elections were parliamentary while other presidential, some opposition leaders were charismatic and conducted remarkable campaign while others less so, youth organizations played a powerful role in some countries while more marginal in others and some required mass protest before new governments were able to take power while others not.
Which factors seem to have inspired and constituted electoral revolutions? The main common feature was a hybrid character of the regime located in the wide zone between full-scale democracy and hard-line dictatorship. The political systems were "repressive enough to invite public resentment but liberal enough to be open at least potentially to the development of an opposition" (Bunce, 2006 :2-3, Silitski, 2005b . In addition, the minimal condition shared by the regimes was the fact that elections were held regularly, although tolerance of opposition as well as transparency of electoral process varied (Bunce, 2006) .
Illiberal leaders were closely associated with escalating levels of corruption, financial scandals and in some instances violence against political opponents (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006) .
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When the incumbent leaders had antagonized their societies through repression, mismanagement and corruption, the demand for political change became overwhelming.
Provided that opposition united and began to work together and civil society matured enough to mobilize both voters and peaceful protesters, the electoral breakthrough materialized (Silitski, 2005b) . Cooperation among opposition forces was crucial not only for the pre-election campaign in order to convince public to participate and express dissatisfaction with the regime and protest should the incumbents try to steal the election but it also proved important for encouraging institutional supporters of the regime -such as police, army and intelligence services -either to maintain their distance or to defect (Bunce, 2006) . The mechanisms of the electoral model such as parallel vote tabulations, exit polls and domestic and foreign election monitoring proved to be extremely important methods for securing free, fair and transparent elections (McFaul, 2005) . To this end, the presence of (at least relatively) independent media able to relay news about falsified vote and publicize mounting popular protests was another important element of the electoral model (McFaul, 2005 , Silitski, 2005a . Procedurally, the opposition movements have strictly adhered to the law as they strove to legitimize themselves by playing by rules set by institutions and leaders they rebelled against. Carrying out the revolution according revolution-democratization on welfare. First, the dissatisfaction of citizens who rallied in the streets was multi-faced and the political dimension was only one of several along which the discontent transpired. Second, electoral revolutions were characterized by the ability of opposition parties to unite across political parties which is a factor conducive to potential reforms. Indeed, in this respect, the electoral revolutions brought about unique windows of opportunity for changing the developmental paths of the countries. Third, electoral revolutions were characterized by rallies and high degree of public involvement which significantly contributed to the success of electoral outcomes. Therefore, the new leaders were 'indebted' to public.
While all the democratizing regimes shared high corruption levels, problematic privatization processes and some of them functioned on the principles of 'crony capitalism' (Silitski, 2005a , Tucker, 2005 , 5 the level of economic development or the state of economy did not play a uniform causal role in the democratic breakthroughs. First, in the two early cases of electoral revolutions -Romania and Bulgaria -the immediate cause of the protests were the economic and financial crisis caused by delayed transition which led to severe economic hardship and social concerns. Contrary to that, Slovak macroeconomic indicators before the 1998 parliamentary elections were relatively positive and experienced full deterioration after the breakthrough (as a result of reforms introduced by the new government). Similarly Ukraine prior to the electoral turnover had a history of stable macroeconomic environment and robust economic growth accompanied by FDI inflow.
Interestingly, according to modernization theory, in the long term there is a link between rising wealth of the country, the emergence of middle class and democratization which 5 Oligarchic capitalism has been present particularly in the later cases -Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia.
could explain the social basis of Orange revolution in Ukraine (McFaul 2006) . In contrast, Serbia and Georgia had been living through periods of economic trauma and hardship that certainly helped to undermine the regimes, although they were not an immediate trigger of the change (McFaul, 2005 , McFAul, 2006 . In sum, economic and social factors played an important role in nearly all the cases of electoral breakthrough either as an immediate cause (Romania, Bulgaria) or as factors which helped to undermine the legitimacy or valence of the incumbents to govern the country (Serbia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, partly Ukraine).
II. Imperfect regimes and the basis of electoral revolutions in Bulgaria and

Slovakia
The electoral revolutions in Bulgaria and Slovakia belong to the early cases. The political turnover did not necessitate popular protest after the elections in order to oust the illiberal incumbents out of power. The mass vote participation and the ability of the opposition to mobilize population through campaigning, however, demonstrate extensive discontent of the citizens with the old regimes. In the following analysis I provide more details about the pivotal elections, their development and societal groups which supported the change.
The pivotal elections in Bulgaria took place on 19 April, 1997. As assessed by international organizations monitoring, they were free and fair. Although the flow of the elections in itself was satisfactory, turbulent era marked by political tension and popular street protests preceded it. The Prime Minister resigned in late December 1996 and the opposition marched to streets with a mass popular support in order to force postcommunist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), in government since 1994, to agree to early elections. The reasons and the main theme of street protests which continued for about a month was the Bulgarian economic misery: the ruling Socialists were blamed for continuing old Communist policies that brought the country to the edge of economic collapse (CNN online, 15.1.1997) . The protests were led by the Union of Democratic Forces which, as discussed above, won the elections in 1991 but then lost the seats after the vote of noconfidence the following year. The Socialist party then won the 1994 elections with a promise to undertake less painful reforms. Their policy, however, turned out to be one of no reforms with an aversion to privatization and to the entry of foreign investors into the economy (CNN online, 19.4.1997) . Under the ex-communist rule GDP showed decline rather than growth and the inflation soared pushing wages and pensions below subsistence levels. In 1997, Bulgaria was among poorest of the transition countries (CNN online, 15.1.1997). Interestingly, the opposition enjoyed strong backing from students and labor unions during the protests. Several sectors of the economy, such as miners, health care and public transportation workers and taxi unions, participated (CNN online, 11.1.1997).
Schools, hospitals and factories held protests ranging from one-hour warning strikes and rallies to wearing blue ribbons symbolizing protest. Together with wide numbers of population also businessmen and business-minded politicians called for change and share of urban population (Gyárfášová and Húska, 1999) . Among those who expressed discontent with the regime was also the Confederation of Trade Unions (Málová, 1999: 169-177 ). Representatives of political parties, NGOs, trade unions, the independent media and a part of the Church actively participated in and constituted broad civic mobilizations (Butora et al, 1999:17) . There was a considerable fear about potential electoral fraud and thus the elections were closely scrutinized both by the Slovak public and the international community (Henderson, 2002:48) . Despite the worries, the elections and handing-over of the power was free, fair and peaceful.
The election results de iure brought victory to Mečiar's HZDS which received the biggest share with 27% of the votes. However, not only was this significantly less than in 1994, the amount of votes also resulted in the de facto incapacity to form a coalition. The opposition forces won a 58% share of the votes which translated into the constitutional majority in the parliament. A pro-Western but ideologically diverse left-right coalition was formed. 7 Again, in a narrow sense, the Slovak electoral revolution was a success -semi- The most recent election outcomes show that the defeat of incumbents in electoral revolutions has not prevented them from actively re-entering political scenes in both
Bulgaria and Slovakia few years later. The outcomes in the other countries in respect to coming to terms with illiberal politics after the breakthrough elections are yet less optimistic (see Kuzio, 2008) . In Slovakia, the improvement after the elections in 1998 in respect to macroeconomic indicators was rather modest. Overall, the economic performance of Slovakia could be described as having a 'U-shape'. The data worsened close to 1998 and remained on relatively poor level for few years after the electoral revolution. GDP growth reached only 2% in 2000, budget deficit grew to 12.3% and the external debt increased.
b. Broad betterments? -limits of socioeconomic improvement i. Economic indicators after electoral revolutions
Reforms put off under the Mečiar regime and the problems related to late start were blamed for the economic hardship and severity of the process. The progress started to materialize only towards the end of the first Dzurinda's government term in the office. After several years of declining real wages, increasing unemployment and debt, the trend was finally reversed from 2002. The coalition was successful at implementing several necessary reforms which included restructuring the banking sector, improving the business environment and state regulation of the financial sector and restructuring and privatizing state-owned enterprises, among them also some of the so-called strategic industries (Vachudova, 2005 , EIU, 2000 . The remaining reforms in the sphere of health care, pension system and combating high unemployment that had been put off during the first The EBRD transition reports have provided reliable analysis of overall transition process. Table 1 Source: EBRD Transition Reports: 1998 , 2000 , 2003 How successful were then the countries in progressing after the electoral revolution on the economic dimension? Presumably, the mere fact that Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007
suggests that its economic standing had in a decade improved. The greatest improvements appear to have materialized in macro-economy as the Bulgarian micro-economy still in mid2000s needed recuperation -in fact, it only stood at the levels of 1998 Slovakia. In contrast, Slovakia had far fewer corrections to perform and enjoyed a solid economy, although the country remained to face high unemployment and regional inequalities. The Slovak regional success and acknowledgement it has earned -being dubbed the world leading reformerseem to be in the economic dimension, however, to some extent the fruits of solid fundamentals established by the pre-electoral revolution heritage.
ii. Social indicators after the revolutions
As the previous section examined, both Bulgaria and Slovakia have been very successful at safeguarding sustainability of public finance and adequate anti-inflationary monetary policy together with sustainable growth. These parameters are traditionally viewed as necessary conditions to fight poverty and secure economic and social well-being of the population (Beblavy, 2005: 4-7) . In principle, however, these policies are not sufficient for increasing living standards of the population. Employment and unemployment tend to be key objectives of any antipoverty policy as poverty strongly correlates with unemployment.
Social standards in Bulgaria prior to the revolution were as a result of inflation and malmanagement of public finance very low. Likewise, in Slovakia the level of living standards was a target of criticism from the opposition as well as population. Both countries suffered from persistent and very high levels of unemployment after the electoral breakthroughs. This section thus concentrates on exploring how successful the policies of post-electoral revolution governments in tackling social problems and improving living conditions of citizens across social classes were. I will look at the overall progress in living standards measured in unemployment, poverty and inequality levels and social spending expenditures. I also briefly assess the character and extent of reforms. (Table 2) . Nevertheless, unemployment remains a major social problem particularly in the Eastern and Southern districts exacerbating regional inequalities. In addition, very low levels of employment in both countries, which even in the run up to the EU accession in Slovakia continued to stagnate, are problematic, albeit in relative terms to Bulgaria Slovakia performs somewhat better.
Second, regarding the levels of inequality at the early stages of transition, Slovakia was at the fall of communism considered to be one of the most egalitarian societies with Gini coefficient measures the ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income to that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income. 13 Available at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/PovCalServlet?povResultSvy.jsp (May 15, 2006) inequality in Bulgaria amounted to 36.6%; Slovak records in 1998 shows 26.2% income Gini (Table 2) (Table 2) .
Third, social protection expenditures can serve as a rough proxy to assess development on social dimension. In Slovakia, social protection expenditure has seen a declining trend: from 20% of GDP in 1998 GDP in , to 19% in 2002 GDP in and 17.3% in 2003 (Grosh, 2005) . In 2003 it amounted to 17.6% of GDP having thus increased significantly; additional 3.9% of GDP were spent on education (Ibidem).
Both Bulgaria and Slovakia have as part of the second generation reforms undertaken changes in their welfare systems. While the process has been lengthy with partial reforms and changes occurring throughout the whole transition period, several important adjustments took place during the post-electoral revolution regimes under liberal governments. In Slovakia, the reform of welfare system, accompanied by a series of economic reforms, has been very extensive and comprehensive and affected tax system, health care, pension system, banking, and fiscal decentralization. Labor market legislation and structure of social benefits have undergone comprehensive changes as well. With the main objective to increase flexibility of labor market and decrease mal-use of the system, universal replacement payments decreased being replaced by targeted transfers, such as bonuses to families with children (Gonda and Dostal, 2004) . Tightening and conditionality of the welfare benefits on public works, child tax credits and cuts in social security contributions sought to make even work with relatively low salaries pay (Beblavy, 2005) . All when the second-tier individual savings system came into effect (ILO, 2005:78) . After its tax reform, Bulgaria ranks among the countries with the lowest levels of taxation in the region.
Similarly to Slovakia, labor policy is aimed at financing active labor market measures, such as public work programs, employment promotion measures, and vocational training (Ibidem, (48) (49) .
The above analysis shows that progress in social inclusion in the aftermath of electoral revolution has been limited at best. Given the fiscal constraints and external pressures which haunted the transition economies throughout, it appears to be the case that the (neo-liberal) withdrawal of the state from the economy rather than expansion of social policy was not so much a 'philosophy' but rather a mere necessity (see for example UNDP, 1998:25-26) . In the Slovak case due to Maastricht criteria requirements and the late entry into the race for foreign investment which has become a necessary element of job creation, source of knowledge, finance and upgrading, the reforms which were implemented had to compromise between 'economic protectionism' and 'social protectionism' (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007) . In Bulgaria, similar constraints appear to come as much from the EU as from the lender institutions -Bulgarian debt remains increasingly high and extracts resource which could otherwise be used for other purposes. Hence, the improvement on indicators of governance, political stability and democratization and the progress in respect to financial austerity, budget management, quality of business environment and FDI inflows, was not paralleled by a similar trend in social dimension. 
IV. Conclusion
The electoral revolutions experienced by several post-communist countries represent an instrument of breakthrough on their developmental path: after the pivotal elections the countries were moved in a more democratic direction. The revolutions were accompanied by public euphoria and expectations of change for the better which arguably could have resulted into better social and living standards. In spite of sound theoretical expectations, the great improvements in the indicators of governance and democratization and progress on macroeconomic level were not transferred equally into cross-societal superior living standards and social inclusion, in spite of the fact that general levels of GDP took place. Given the differences in proximate causes of electoral revolutions -political in Slovakia while economic in Bulgaria, the work finds that the most significant impact of electoral breakthrough cannot be identified in general terms and is highly country specific. In the particular cases under investigation here, the greatest contribution of the electoral revolution materialized in the dimension where the country at the time had the greatest difficulties. Bulgaria's disastrous macroeconomic standing after the electoral breakthrough remarkably improved. For Slovakia, the greatest contribution of the 1998 elections was in the political component. In sum, electoral revolution as an instrument of breakthrough on the developmental paths of transition economies yielded only a limited success when understood in a broader sense than just major political change. The good start that Slovakia embarked on at the early 1990s versus the very slow transition in Bulgaria seems to have been detrimental for the extent and success of the catch-up process after the electoral revolution. The implementation of reforms by liberal minded politicians was in Bulgaria constrained to a great extent by its poor pre-electoral legacy; Bulgaria was in 1997 de facto still only at the beginning of the transition. On the other hand, the Slovak economic state of affairs before 1998 was very good even for major part of Mečiar regime. Thus, the Slovak economic success of the last few years has its origins not only in the ambitious comprehensive reforms implemented by the two Dzurinda governments. Rather, a good share of the credit can be traced back to the pre-1998 era. In respect to limited improvements in social dimension, the findings of this work align with the inferences of the branch of democratization and transition literature which stresses the importance of historical legacies (such as inherited industry and institutional profile), the early marketization strategies and fiscal constraints on the ability of states to reform and the role that social policy takes in the shift to freer societies (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, Haggard and Kaufman, 2008) . 
